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The article explores joint consumption equilibrium environments. It illus-
trates network formation through one-to-one directional synapses. Family
(couple) arrangements, spontaneously generated under a decentralized gen-
eral equilibrium price system are suggested | involving link and direction-
specic transfer prices along with standard resource one. The research also
inspects preference characteristics able to generate monogamous choices and
assortative matching and mating. Assortative mating (and income pooling)
is claried, related to exclusivity or taste-for unicity at the utility level with
respect to shared good, with optimal assignment connected to equalization of
the marginal benet of the match | adequately dened | across individuals
in the economy.
Contrast with a multiple external eect good | one-to-many communica-
tion; (or) shared by a xed number of, more than two, individuals; common
property | and with a pure public good is also provided. If paired consump-
tion with end-point specicity generates (or may generate), under reasonable
assumptions, a unique decentralized equilibrium solution, supporting an e-
cient allocation, multiple agent sharing among more than two individuals and
individual types requires, along with excludability, perfect dierentiation of a
larger number of consumption | partnership | roles.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mutual agreement is required for a large number of everyday transac-
tions. Some are over a pure private good or service, and standard marginal
pricing insures ecient allocations. Others, generate partial externalities
or are even totally public, requiring superseding judgement. A fringe (...)
are social in nature, its consumption implying benets for two | or a giv-
en number of | aected agents. They may or may not require indirect
costs from those traders (e.g., time) | they may or may not involve an
externality |, they are identiable both by the initiating and ending side
of the consumption proposition and require complete consensus regarding
its consumption/expenditure level.
The requirement of mutual agreement | involving excludability | al-
lows a decentralized price system to insure an ecient allocation, provided
discrimination between the two consumption sides is perfect: then, eec-
tively, it is as if the two roles would distinguish themselves as two (times
the number of individual types in the economy) dierent goods but not
sold separately. The argument resembles the one applied to club goods |
yet, here, the externality status is minor to qualify equilibrium properties1,
conned to a given or xed number of people2, and stresses the require-
ment of equal consumption | or sharing | of a total common \property"
or durable; optimal pricing is (can be) achieved through transfers | or
implicit consumption price discrimination |, which are due even if agents
are homogeneous as long as they value dierently the two roles (making
and attending calls) in the \call society".
Understandably, a similar modelling framework has been applied in the
economics of family and family formation: early examples3 are Manser
and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), suggesting marriage
for allowing joint consumption by two agents | that bargain with each
other while possessing, maintaining well-dened, \selsh"4, individual pref-
erences and budget constraints5 | of special | household | public goods.
Even if similar, our formalization presents a crucial dierence: excludability
by either side, and \family role" denition for each potential match; then,
1Or we could say that we would fall under Coase's theorem ...
2Say, total congestion is achieved with a xed or maximum number of partners.
3That also include, more recently, Lam (1988) and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) |
see Bergstrom (1996), Weiss (1997) and Vermeulen (2004) for recent surveys.
4Even if we can argue that some degree of altruism | and partner-specic inclination
| can always be reected in preferences for goods that are or must be shared with other
individuals.
5Most of these family models end up by assuming pooled income.CALLS AND COUPLES 247
under the usual ideal assumptions6, a decentralized general equilibrium can
be expected to promote ecient mating.
In family economics, two agent bargaining | interaction - is general-
ly assumed. One can propose functional forms that are able to generate
monogamy as polygamy | the later reproducing multi-(even if one-to-
one)-connections. Assortative matching and mating can be studied with
reference to the properties of the uncompensated individual demands and
indirect utility functions7 | which now also depend on partner(s) income
and preferences | generated under exclusivity conditions. Then, transfer-
able utility, or income | this mimicking, or eectively originating, budget
pooling by the couple |, leads to the emergence of dowry systems. We
then have a two-part tari example8 in the pricing system.
The framework can also encompass more complex societies | allow com-
mon property to be shared by more than two agents. In principle, network
formation could be simulated by assuming that each connection between
any two nodes is unique, with a node | as a neuron | having a life of its
own. In the limit, joint-consumption by more than two individuals leads
to a similar environment as that in the presence of a public good. With
excludability, the only diculty for a decentralized equilibrium arises from
lack of competition and the leading (as others) role denition.
Also, productive factors | as outputs | can be shared by dierent
divisions or plants of a rm...The theory suggests the adequate properties
of an internal pricing scheme able to generate an ecient decentralized
system management.
Finally, access cost and thus access pricing9 is, however, only barely
touched. Those (additional) costs of establishing n nodes, if a function of
number of served clients | say, platform establishment costs|, would just
require a (additional) xed fee | suggesting a two-part tari price of calls,
as real immobile systems apply. We assume they are zero in most of the
research | which may be reasonable for family study arrangements...). If
these costs are periodic, a static model would apply; if not, the study of the
subject could recommend a dynamic framework. The platform resembles
a club good, but accessed by all individuals in the economy.
The exposition proceeds as follows: notation and individuals' utility func-
tions are dened in section 2. Section 3 states the properties of an ecient
allocation, and section 4 those of a decentralized equilibrium. In section
6Which, of course, rule out imperfect information or foresight, ex-post contract de-
fault, etc...The absence of the ideal conditions is what makes bargaining models of the
family so appealing.
7See Becker (1973), Lam (1988). The analysis here diers both because budget con-
straints are never pooled, nor objective functions altered by connection establishment.
8See Littlechild (1975) for an early discussion of the subject.
9See Dewenter and Haucap, eds. (2007) for a recent overview of the subject.248 ANA PAULA MARTINS
5, we proceed to the derivation of demands, indirect utilities and equilibri-
um congurations for specic functional forms and in section 6, assortative
mating is qualied under dierent transferability environments. Contrast
with multiple emission entities is dealt with in section 7. The exposition
ends with a brief summary.
2. NOTATION: PREFERENCES AND SHARED GOODS
There are n consumers in the economy. Each consumer, i, enjoys utility
from the consumption of a private good, the quantity of which is denoted
by xi, from the quantity of \calls" he makes to individual j, z
j
i | the
consumption of z proposed by i and accepted by j | and from those he
receives from that same individual, y
j
i | the consumption of z proposed










































































i) is assumed to exhibit the usual properties | continuity, twice-
dierentiability and quasi-concavity.




j; i 6= j;i;j = 1;2;:::;n (2)
The distinction between z
j
i and yi
j has two purposes: on the one hand,
it represents the fact that there is perfect discrimination of the two con-
sumption roles, and that i (may) faces a dierent net price for z
j
i than that
charged to j for yi
j; (but...) as we assume that there is mutual excludabil-











i. These two conditions will allow
for an ecient price system to develop. It would appear to apply well to
calls, and it suggests the natural arising of gender dierentiation | further
stressed in economic dwelling by the requirement of denition of \head of
household" status, of individual responsible for the child education...
On the other, it allows us to explore and understand similarities and dif-
ferences between a pure externality (i.e., z
j
i and yi
j are completely non-rival)CALLS AND COUPLES 249
and mere joint-consumption at equal levels | suggesting generalizations
reproducing economies of scale in joint-consumption.
If i gets the same satisfaction from calling as from getting a call from j,











i); i = 1;2;:::;n (3)
Also, if calls to and from any individual type are valued similarly, even
























i(xi;zi + yi) i = 1;2;:::;n (4)
Of course, such additivity may occur in sets, with individual types arising
distinctively for each i at the utility level.
Each individual is endowed with amount Wi
x of good x and Wi
z of good
z. We will consider two scenarios:
 one in which only z
j
i requires Wz | on a one-to-one basis |, with y
j
i
being a (almost) complete externality




i require the use of Wz.
Yet, (2) | i.e., agreement from interlocutor |, must always be ensured.
And, of course, whether an externality or pure joint-consumption at the
same level for both sides applies (or other | see below), it must recognized
by every individual in the economy.
A link between i and j requires no \xed" costs, i.e., independent from




i) traded10. Network access (or set-up) costs |
pure access to the markets where z and y are trade | are also assumed
negligible11.
A complex decentralized price system is proposed: px is the unit price
of good x. The price of a call from i to j is composed of three parts: a
general \call tari" pz, an answering tari py, and a specic unit transfer
from i to consumer j for attending the call, t
j
i. I.e., the consumption of z
j
i
by i requires an additional \service" from j, priced at t
j
i.
10These could justify the emergence of monogamous couples even with preferences
exhibiting taste for variety...And of dowries and bequests in the market independent
of household quantity.
11They would not aect the general conclusions in what concerns marginal properties
of interior solutions, provided that they are independent of network quantities aggre-
gation...They would then justify an access pricing xed fee independent of the use
intensity. We will discuss their role briey at the next sections.250 ANA PAULA MARTINS

















































z, we conclude that the
general taris must add up to the operating cost of a call p0
z, at which Wz
is traded.
p0
z = pz + py (7)
Notice that once we allow for transfers, payment can be collected on one-
side of the call | charging (pz + py) to z | only: in practice, the actual
individual transfers would also include the recovery of py.
For example, for common calls, pz = p0
z and py = 0. Child allowance
schemes | see Lundberg and Pollak (1993), p. 1001 |, or merely nature's
assignment of child-bearing and rearing costs, illustrate other unbalanced
arrangements.
If y is non-rival with respect to z, p0
z is split between both sides of the call
according to (7). O-springs would appear to work as such. But a diner
in a restaurant by a couple would involve twice the resources a solitary
diner would | and (but) just require the same level of expenditure by the
two individuals, the leveling of the quantity purchased by each of the two
































2 would price Wz | the average price paid by




j | given that it involves consumption duplication, nobody would want
to buy or sell one of the two sides of the match separately. With joint-
consumption, there will be a sort of sale complementarity; p0
z will then be
the average price of the unit of Wi
z, sold in pairs.









j | purchased by i, yi
j
1+
2 by j | a value of 
12Allowing the price to still dier in both ends...CALLS AND COUPLES 251
smaller than 1 representing economies of scale in household consumption;
then
pz+py
1+ would price Wz
13. Or | allowing z
j
i to stand for half the to-
tal joint purchase so that p0
z =
pz+py
















j | hypothetically,  could be pair specic, 
j
i; such
formulation would certainly be useful in the study of labor supply | if xi
denotes leisure, priced at Wi, Ii = V i + WiTi | full-income | where V i
and Ti are exogenous non-labor earnings and time endowment of i respec-
tively, and pure private goods using Wz, gij, j 6= i, are also allowed such





















1+) (and corner solutions naturally arise).
3. EFFICIENT ALLOCATION
Admit an ecient allocation is sought14. Then, one wants to maximize
an individual's, say i, utility, subject to the existing endowments and lim-
iting utility levels of all other consumers. Assume rst that the receiver











































13Of course,  is assumed to be known by all market characters.
14The eciency classication goes behond that of collective choice models | see
Vermeulen (2004), for example |, once it is stated regardless of any pricing system...We
characterize overall economic eciency, not of intrahousehold allocation only.252 ANA PAULA MARTINS


















































x   x = 0(1 equation) (10)
 jUj
x   x = 0;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n(n   1 eqs.) (11)
Ui
zj   jUj
yi   z = 0;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n(n   1 eqs.) (12)
Ui
yj   jUj
zi   z = 0;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n(n   1 eqs.) (13)
 jUj
zl   lUl
yj   z = 0;j 6= i;l 6= j;l = 1;2;:::;n (14)
 jUj
yl   lUl
zj   z = 0;j 6= i;l 6= j;l = 1;2;:::;n (15)
along with (8a) (8c) and (8d) in equality. (12) to (15) include n(n 1)
dierent equations | the number of existing z
j
i's.







;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (16)





























;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (17)





























;j 6= i;l 6= j;l = 1;2;:::;n (18)
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;j 6= i;l 6= j;l = 1;2;:::;n (21)
(17) and (18) reproduce the well-known condition that the sums of the
marginal rates of substitution of consumption partners must equate the
marginal rate of transformation in the economy. (20) and (21) | in ab-
sence of externality |require that the average of those marginal rates of
substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation.
Notice that the eciency (Samuelson-type) condition, implying equal-
ization of the sum (or averages if just joint-consumption) of the marginal
rates of substitution between the shared and private good at the two con-
sumption ends across the economy, is immune to mating or transferability
considerations: it applies to any given welfare | ex-ante or ex-post trans-
fers, as appropriate | utility levels of other individuals, j 6= i, we supply
to the generic problem.
Suppose that in addition to the operating costs there is also a platform
of size n, which costs in terms of zC(n). If n is exogenously xed, it would





















Samuelson condition would still be valid.
4. SUPPORTING GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
Let each individual be subject to the general linear price conditions s-
tated in section 2: in the economy, one unit of x costs px; one unit of z
costs p0
z being jointly purchased and split between a caller and a receiv-
er, accompanied by a consumer set/couple-specic unit transfer t
j






























z = Ii (24)





































and FOC for i = 1;2;:::;n:
Ui
x   px = 0 (26)
Ui
zj   (pz + t
j
i) = 0;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (27)
Ui
yj   (py   ti
j) = 0;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (28)
with the budget constraint. Notice that as i can veto and ends up paying
for yi
j, optimization in it is due | and (28) arises | whether its consump-
tion by i and j is completely non-rival (i.e., works as a complete \exter-
nality") or not: there is mutual excludability between the i and j in the




i. For a perfect externality, (28) would not






















; j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n(n   1eqs. for each i) (30)
The conditions are valid for any consumer. Equilibrium requires addition-
ally mutual consent on the call, (8b), with the price share, (7), that suppliesCALLS AND COUPLES 255




j; i 6= j;i;j = 1;2;:::;n(n  (n   1) eqs.) (31)
p0




















It is straightforward to conclude that under common assumptions, pro-




px, there will be an and a unique equilibri-
























px ) | with
n(n 1)+3 elements: we have 2(n 1) equations of form (29) and (30)
and the budget constraint per consumer (generating the n + 2n(n   1) =
n(2n 1) individual demands), and the n(n 1)+3 composed of (31), (32)
and aggregate market equilibrium ones | n(3n   2) + 3 equations | yet,
the sum of the budget constraints together with (33) and (34) imply (32)
and only n(3n 2)+2 would be independent; on the other hand, the rela-
tive prices and the allocations z
j
i and yi
j together include the same number
of unknowns: n  (n   1) + 3 relative prices and n(2n   1) quantities.
In other words, the price system has now two degrees of freedom: not
only (and as usual) may px be supplied, or x xed as numeraire, as an
exogenous convention about the splitting of the full price p0
z between the
two \end-sides" of the deal | proposing and accepting parties | must
also be agreed upon and supplied by society | usually taking the form
py = 0...
One can show that such system supports an ecient solution. Every






















; l 6= j;l = 1;2;:::;n (36)


























; j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (37)256 ANA PAULA MARTINS
which reproduces (17), with
pz+Py
px having correspondence with
z
x. As it
must be valid for any consumer pair, it encompasses (18).

























i > 0 and a transfer is due from i to j for the former's
call if i appreciates (relative to consuming x) making calls to j more than
its direct payment (i.e.,
pz
px); and if j appreciates (relative to consuming x)
receiving calls from i less than people have to pay to receive calls (i.e.,
py
px).
No \lump-sum" transfers from i to j, are required or t to insure equi-
librium | a \dowry" would be here proportional to the bridal value: each
link is free and everybody expected to be linked with everybody...They
would be if there were (physical, i.e., in terms of the available resources, Wx
and Wz) \xed costs" associated with the establishment of each particular
link.
However, once linkages are person-specic, the described equilibrium
may be dicult to emerge due to lack of competition in unit transfer price
formation; then, the exogeneity and constancy of the net of transfers prices
as faced by individuals | required for (28) and (29) to apply | becomes
questionable. One can claim that links are interchangeable, and/or that
other links provide interpersonal-link comparisons | nevertheless, the ar-
gument remains...
Let us explore a little more deeply the demand formation in the economy.












































































z | enjoy standard properties. And z
j






































px ), which is also a
consumer demand, but of another individual.




independent of transfer prices can be derived from (37) and, replacing (35)CALLS AND COUPLES 257





























Those demand functions would be homogeneous of degree 0 in I1;I2;:::;
Ii;:::;In;px and pz + py but would not exhibit all of the other usual
properties. They are independent of transfer prices because they already
internalized its formation (rule). Moreover, each individual's demand |
including that of the purely private good | is expected to be a function of
everybody else's income, and not independent of its particular distribution,
the same being true for indirect utility functions.
Compensated eects of an individual i's demand can be derived at xed




l ) = Uj;j = 1;2;:::;n, and at xed utility of i and
xed income of all others, xi(I1;I2;:::;Ui;:::;In;px;pz + py).






l ) would come from solv-
ing (39) with respect to xi (with more private goods, it would also imbed
equality of their common marginal rate of substitution to their relative






l ) would arise then from the traditional conditions (here,
just inverting the utility function; with more private goods, MRS between
them should equal the corresponding price ratio), yet i's conditional ex-
penditure function would be generated according to the left hand-side of
(39).
Requiring the sum (over all i) of Marshallian demands xi(I1;I2;:::;Ii;:::;










px ) to equalize available
resource endowment (supply) in the economy | and replacing the Ii's by
the corresponding denition | would allow us to infer the general equilib-
rium relative full price,
pz+py
px .




































With the same preferences and endowments, the equilibrium allocation
will dier from the one before, but share all other mathematical properties
except for the optimal endowment price: now, (pz + py) is the price of a
pair of units of Wi





(pz + py) (41)
If consumers are homogeneous (have the same preferences and endow-
ments) but receiving and making calls are valued dierently so that the
typical utility function is of type (4), there is only a need for two prices |
potentially, pz and py | to characterize equilibrium, yet z
j
i is sold to (in
if there is no externality) pairs.





i at the utility level and at both consumption
sides, as the marginal utility for i of consuming one extra unit of is e-
qual to that of consuming y
j
i, the net price he will pay for either, say
p
j
i, would equalize in an interior solution; then, simply adjusting z
j
i by
not answering some, or prolonging a call by calling after a hang-up would


















the full expenditure on the resource. Then, again, unit transfers are really
redundant | the argument of potential lack of competition in unit transfer
price formation removed | but, in general, not otherwise ...
With agent types multiplicity and some set additivity of form (4) at the
utility level, the exogenous splitting rule of the total p0
z and perfect indi-
vidual type identication | discrimination | and consumer replication,
a uniquely decentralized equilibrium can arise, produce a unique equilibri-
um relative full price(s), a type-to-type specic transfer, and it is ecient.
Then, it would be as if i buys z
j
i for pz + py and then j buys y
j
i from (in-
dividuals of type) i for (py   ti




Or, in a dierent light but representing the same structure, if we assume
that n is a xed number of possible connections, coinciding with the number
of agent types in the economy, provided that calls with each type may
accumulate | i.e., an individual of type i can receive calls from more than
(as a fraction of those made by) one individual of type j |, the previous
price system is sucient. If they cannot, and only one individual of eachCALLS AND COUPLES 259
type (that is, income and preferences, identifying i and j) can be connected
to another to allow z
j
i, a lump-sum transfer system for each connection |
with i receiving net (Ki   Kj) from a connection with an individual of
type j;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n |, may emerge, leaving identical individuals
indierent in equilibrium.
Likewise, in family couples, (4) would hardly imply monogamy; if we
allow for (3) and assume that there are xed | n | individual types
(characterized both by preferences and income level) in the economy and
z
j
i represents a potential joint consumption of an individual of type i with
another of type j, partner selection and stable family establishment could
arise from extensive corner solutions, multiple marriages from less extensive
ones. Gender (or \head of household" status) naturally distinguishes each
side of the partnership and provides the required end-side discrimination |
type identication should also be perfect |, and conditions for an ecient
decentralized equilibrium are therefore staged.
A corner solution for z
j
i = 0 will require that also y
j
i = 0; it will occur i,

















j = 0 at
positive consumption of the other goods (and budget constraint multipliers
in the appropriate lagrangean | according to Khun-Tucker conditions). If
i and j are not connected, in the optimal solution, z
j
i = yi




i = 0. The equilibrium relative full price may be expected to go
down while the inequality condition is not met as long as demand and
supply allow, and exclusion | as in a purely private good does | would












px;0;0); it must also supersede the utility that the individual can obtain
paying in full any of the arguments other than xi, say r, | consuming zero
of the others | if shared consumption is allowed but not a psychological



















(or both...) If marginal utilities are non-negative, these are the maximum
individual net prices ever observed | a potential adoption by i of r's
ospring.
15Corner solutions are commonly generated with linear functional forms | a special
case of the CES.260 ANA PAULA MARTINS
If we impose exclusivity | or other exogenous discrete congestion thresh-
old |, yet interchangeable connectivity (one can have but one mate, but
any pair is possible ...Again, this may solve for the lack of competition
in what transfer price formation is concerned ...), a more complex price
exchange is required to insure equilibrium, now at the matching stage |
which or may not feedback to the relative full price level of the shared
resource in the economy. (Dowries are a type of transfer known in his-
tory, o-springs | involving expenditure | an obvious common good to
parents.) Its study is deferred to section 6.
Finally, with platform establishment size costs C(n) added to the prob-
lem, a xed \lump-sum" fee, C(n)=n would additionally be charged to each
individual in the economy | expected if government provided or at least
regulated to insure the provider with null (economic) prots. If there is
no exclusivity, in theory, the platform is a public good. For example (39)
would be replaced by:
xi +





























i = 1;2;:::;n (44)
And even with excluclusivity of the couple assemblage type, these costs
| to make known every partner possible | may occur ...Moreover, partial
excludability does not alter that statement (we are not in the domain of a
club good).
5. SPECIFIC FUNCTIONAL FORMS: MULTI-LEVEL CES
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
In this section, we want to illustrate the impact of preferences on the net-
work equilibrium formation. This is determined by utility function shapes
and their, along with income, distribution; we therefore assume a general
nested CES technology but allow individual specic characteristic coe-
cients.
We shall assume that individuals maximize utility subject to prices and
an exogenous income Ii = pxWi
x + p0
zWi
z;Ii;px;pz, and py are externally
xed | replacing, for simplicity, the xed individual endowments, px, and
py (or pz) of the previous section. An equilibrium will consist of individual
allocations, a relative equilibrium full price,
pz+py
px , and net of unit (rela-
tive) transfer prices. For later convenience, we will present the marshallian
demands and indirect utilities as a function of Ii;i = 1;2;:::;n;px and
p0
z | say, applicable to a small economy that interconnects internally butCALLS AND COUPLES 261
takes international prices as given |, along with the autarky equilibrium
price level | then replaced in demands and indirect utility.
Allocations can be determined from (37), y
j
i = zi























;i = 1;2;:::;n (45)
Unit transfers can later be inferred from (38) | and net-of-transfers
prices from (35) and (36) | but redundant to determine equilibrium.
For simplicity, let us consider an economy with a small number of con-











































ai + aij + aij0 = 1;ai;aij;aij0 > 0;0 < bij;bij0 < 1;i;ij;ij0  1
Then, i = 1
1 i denotes the elasticity of substitution between (among




ik , in each of which ik = 1
1 ik
is the elasticity of substitution between zk
i and yk
i within the composite
k = j;j0.
(Even if we depart from this general functional form, we will only derive
the full equilibrium for special cases. Features implied by some of the rst-
order optimization conditions are, nevertheless, inspected in general...)







































Given the strong separability, the ratios of marginal utilities of i with





16A competitive equilibrium would hardly be expected; but it allows us to derive







i ). Yet, the general equilibrium system remains highly nonlinear;
special cases for the link consumption sub-utility allow us to derive some
conclusions:












































;i = 1;2;3;k = j;j0 (51)
A solution would be obtained combining the last expressions with the




































Reciprocity of some sort requires aikbik = aki(1 bki). With reciprocity
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a3 ;i = 1;2.
If b3i = bi3 = 0:5, then z3
i = zi
3;i = 1;2.
The higher  (the higher the elasticity of substitution  between the
two composites for individuals 1 and 2), the lower the connections with 3




















2) i = k = . (We have a regular CES). Reciprocity: aikbik = aki(1  
bki). Then:
















































Assume further identical relative preferences for calls such that aikbik
ai =
aikbik
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allow us to retrieve the xi's | the demands.

















































































xi | increases with  (and ) i 2
px








Ii > 0; as @
2i
@Ii2 = (   1)vi
1
Ii2 , the whole economy
\overly" rejoices | @
2i
@Ii2 > 0 | with an increase in everyone's endowment
provided the utility function exhibits non-decreasing returns to scale. Also,
the price of z is shared equally by any two partners:
pz + t
j





Departing from (59) and summing both sides, multiplied by p, over the
n individuals in the economy, equalizing to the total resource existence of











(63) implies that the equilibrium relative price of z will decrease with






x (n = 3, the total number of in-
dividuals in the economy); and it will increase with the relative preference
for the jointly consumed good, .
(63) could then be replaced in (59) to (62), using also the income deni-
tion, but there is not much insight to gain with that exercise.CALLS AND COUPLES 265
Admit that income can dier across individuals but  = 0, i.e., of Cobb-
Douglas format. Then, from (57), we conclude that individual demands
are linear in income17:
pxxi + 4pxxi = Ii
This implies, on the one hand, the independence of the individual de-
mand for the private good of income levels other than that of i itself; on
the other | see (66) below |, and (also due to preference symmetry)
the independence of the equilibrium relative full price of z of the income













(1 + 4) 1 (65)
Replacing in the utility function, we obtain i's indirect utility function, vi:




















@Ii@Ik = 0 | there will be no assortative \matching" | nor
positive, nor negative. @i
@Ij = iaijvi
1

















(Ii+Ij)2(Ii+Ij0)Ii , (the equivalent to)
positive assortative mating | subject explored in the next section | is ex-
pected | @
2i





















17Gorman polar forms | to which the Stone-Geary (and Cobb-Douglas), generating
a linear expenditure system, subscribes | are known to generate public goods eects,
or aggregate demands independent of individual income distributions (see Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980), p. 144.) | because the form (quasi-homothetic utility function)
implies linear individual Engel curves (exact aggregation also requires these to exhibit
constant slopes across individuals | see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), p. 150 |,
satised then if individuals share common preferences). Quasi-linear functional forms
| see Bergstrom and Cornes (1983), Lam (1988), Batina and Ihori (2005), p. 89 | are
commonly used alternatives in public goods demand modelling for allowing (because the
ratio of individual's marginal utilities of the public to the private good are linear and
with constant slope across individuals in the latter) aggregation across individuals.266 ANA PAULA MARTINS
I pays a fraction of the price of the good(s) shared with j equal to the
weight of his income relative to the pooled income of the two partners.
And given the Cobb-Douglas format of the utility, consuming something
of all the goods is always worthwhile.










The equilibrium relative price of z will decrease | here, being propor-







it will increase with the relative preference for the jointly consumed good,
































(1 + 4) 1 (70)
v
k

























































































































. With perfect substitutability |
 tends to 1 |, consumption pairs could be expected.









































































;i = 1;2;3;k = j;j0










































If bik = 0:5;zk
i > 0 and yk
i = zi
k = 0 i bki < 0:5; zk
i = 0 and yk
i = zi
k > 0
i bki > 0:5. If zk








































If bik = 0:5 for all i;k, we fall under (3) and there will be multiple values
of zk
i and yk
i but a unique total (zk
i +yk
i ) = (zi
k+yi
k) satisfying equilibrium,
including the corners represented by (77) in equality.268 ANA PAULA MARTINS







ak for \active" links and i = 
































Then, we reached a similar expression to (57). Demands will be similar.
iv) ik =  1;k = j;j0 and the sub-function is of the xed coecient,
Leontief, type | [bikzk
ik





ik tends to min(zk
i ;yk
i ). Then,










































i : there is perfect complementarity between calls made or received


















;i = 1;2;3;k = j;j0 (81)



















= Ii;i = 1;2;3 (82)
For special cases, we arrive at solutions with similar properties as before.
Other interesting formulations would allow for a dierent degree of sub-










i ) = A(aix
i


























= (1   ai)
aikbik[bikzk
ik




































= (1   ai)
aik(1   bik)[bikzk
ik


































Monogamous family formation can then be adequately modeled with
reference to the threshold value of i = 1 or larger | representing taste for
unicity...



















i tends to maxf[bijz
j
ij














ij0 g | note that min(x;y;z) =
max(x 1;y 1;z 1) 1 as well as min(x 1;y 1;z 1) 1 = max(x;y;z) and
use the fact that the CES tends to Leontief | and only pair-wise connec-
tions are formed. (Provided that SOC can still apply). Let us then consider
such limiting case.




































































+ (1   aj)
(1   bji)[bjizi
ji















j0 either may consume only x, and xj0 = I
j0
px | that occurring if j0 is
large (certainly larger than 0). Or, he will pay his connections to only one
of the other k's | either to i or to j, for whom the marginal utility of
























































































His budget constraint becomes:
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An equilibrium may then arise in which any of the three individuals pays
its connections in full to one and only one individual, \free-riding" on the
connections with other(s) | eventually, with an individual not paying.
In sum, with taste for unicity, a mating equilibrium mechanism must
additionally arise ...







































Budget constraints require for the pair i;j:















] = Ii (94)
Let reciprocity of some sort require bij = (1   bji). The traits of the





























If we allow for agent multiplicity, interior pairs can be formed only.
Monogamy would be the rule against polygamy with perfect taste for unici-





i, more adequately qualifying \matching" |, but from corner
solutions patterns | inspecting indirect utility functions properties.
In the symmetric preferences, Cobb-Douglas case (i = 0) for a (mated)
individual i:
pxxi + 2pxxi = Ii272 ANA PAULA MARTINS
where  =
(1 ai)bij

















(1 + 2) 1 (97)
vk










Internalizing equilibrium price formation | now allowing for any given
number of individuals in the economy, n, where each of them mates one









































(1 + 2) 1 (101)
vk































































































Given the special form of the utility function | the linearity of demands
for the private good, with xed (for all i) marginal increment, in I
i
px (andCALLS AND COUPLES 273
independence of mate's income | even if linearity with xed marginal in-
crement also in the latter would imply the same result) |, the relative full
price level is independent of resource distribution. Also due to the unifor-
mity of the direct utility functions, it is also independent of the particular
mating arrangement that should come to develop in the economy.
Nevertheless, out of similar special cases, mating dynamics are expected
to feedback to it.
6. ASSORTATIVE MATING AND TRANSFERABILITY
6.1. Introduction
In this section, we are going to suggest some of the expected mating
arrangements in an economy where individual i (i = 1;2;:::;n) possess-
es utility potential vk
i (Ii;Ik), where Ii(k) is i(k)'s income, if paired with
k 6= i, and the equilibrium devices involved in its determination. Obvi-
ously, vk
i (Ii;Ik) may represent an indirect utility function of individual
i arising from a direct utility function exhibiting taste-for-unicity and an
optimization involving shared-consumption | say, such as (96).
We will further assume that vk
i (Ii;Ik) = vi(Ii;Ik), all k and i, that the
same general indirect utility function form applies for all potential mates,




@Ik > 0 for
all i;k, and all the individuals I | with the rst sub-index i left in the
indirect utility function just to indicate the individual to which it belongs
to. This is a simplifying assumption18: we might as well just require that
any potential mate k is preference ordered | ranked | similarly by any i
in the economy.
Everybody wants to mate with the highest income. He can just mate
one individual...as also the second lowest income: mating types will con-
stitute a relatively scarce resource, the usual setting under which pricing
systems naturally develop. But for pricing to occur, one must be able to
pay in some other resource | i.e., to trade. Given the context | vi(Ii;Ik)
|, a plausible \numeraire" would then be income Ii19. Another, often
encountered in the family economics literature, is utility | utility units |
itself: utility is then invoked to be transferable between the couple.
If neither utility nor endowments (income...) are transferable | in-
dividuals \must" obtain utility according to vi(Ii;Ik), because @i
@Ik > 0
for all i, | more generally, because the ranking of potential mates in the
economy is uniform |, we expect positive assortative mating in the econo-
18Form (96) obeys it due to the uniformity of direct preferences in the economy of the
special case...
19We might as well consider one of the two endowments...We are assuming that any
of them can.274 ANA PAULA MARTINS
my: higher income (more highly preferred as mate) individuals will cluster
together starting at the highest level.
In other cases, dierent assignments may be generated. Some contexts
have been thoroughly studied in the literature, namely, transferable utilities
| see Legros and Newman (2002) for recent references20. However, not
all cases; and when eciency was analyzed, connection with the implicit
supporting price system was missing. We therefore proceed to both.
6.2. Transferable Utilities
One can nd in Becker (1973) a proof that, in the presence of transfer-
able utilities, positive (negative) assortative mating is optimal in the sense
that it maximizes the sum of individuals' utilities, positively dependent on
the income of each of the individuals forming a pair, i @
2i
@Ii@Ik > (<)0. The
condition was later generalized to the requirement of super (sub) modular-
ity | see for instance, Legros and Newman (2002) for a denition. In this
sub-section, we provide an intuition (an alternative proof) for the result,
when @i
@Ik > 0 for all i, after characterizing a rst-order condition principle
for ecient matching and relate it to the supporting (general equilibrium)
pricing system. We further digress on the spontaneous mating arrangement
arising when matching pairs are formed with individuals of distinct groups.
The marginal benet obtained by individual i, with income Ii, by mating
with individual k of income Ik, call it dk
i , is the utility gain he obtains by
mating with k instead of with the individual k   1 when potential mates
are ordered by ascending order of income. I.e.:
dk
i = vi(Ii;Ik)   vi(Ii;Ik 1) (104)
In a decentralized economy, mating changes are expected to occur till
equality of the marginal benet of the match | the price (in utility units)
that individuals would pay for the last match improvement - across the






 1) = pMF;i = 1;2;:::;n (105)
Such rule would stem from rst-order conditions for eciency | char-





which, at given individual income levels and in the presence utility trans-
ferability would appear as the natural maximand: the couple formed by
i has joint utility maximized for (n=2   1) given levels of sum of couple
utilities we assign to other couples.
Let then the n individuals that are mated be ordered ascendingly ac-
cording to their own income level, i(k) = 1;2;:::;n. Then, i pays a \net"
20Also, Bulow and Levin (2006) | when both agent types to be matched maximize




i = pMF(rk   ri)  pMF(k   i) (106)
where ri(rk)22 represents the rank order of individual i(k) by individual










)   pMF(k   i) (107)
in the optimal match in which he is paired with k, the one chosen to
operate utility transfers with. The equalization of the marginal benet of
mating with k to the ranking points price arises naturally from FOC of
the discrete choice problem facing i of determining the k that maximizes
vk








), all i;k, and therefore transfers are conned to
each pair.
pMF is the price of the income ranking points in the economy for match-
ing purposes. Those points are attributed according to a classication that
ranges from 1 to n23, (i.e., even if there is income replication, in which
case the rank of equally endowed individuals could be the mid-rank of the
individuals in the category) where n is the number of individuals that were
paired, discrete24 and consecutive if all incomes dier. Such pricing scheme
occurs, or is due, because unicity is required at the utility level | match-
ing with j has the opportunity cost of not being available to match with
somebody else.
In equilibrium, for individuals that were not mated by the matching
market (that stayed outside the group of the n mated ones | i.e., such n
21See Botticini and Siow (2003) for a recent overview of other rationales for dowries
and bequests.
22They can just slightly dier from i(k) |at most, i   ri = 1;k   rk = 1 -, because
one cannot mate with oneself...
23This preference ordering | quantifying quality | of the match with each individual,
k, must be uniformly accepted and agreed upon in the economy | be independent of i
- for the price system (competition or market for ranking points-discrete quantities, but
nevertheless aggregatable quantities) to work. If not, and ij is the preference ordering
assessment of individual i by individual j in a scale of 1 (least preferred) to n 1 (most




ij points, uniquely appreciated by









(k 1)j] = p to be constant in the optimal assignment,
where k is i's pair | vi(i;k) i's utility when paired with k -, (k 1) his next preference,
and p the price of all ranking points in the market  n
Pn 1











24The price will be that of a discrete ranking of potential partners, not of their income:
what is as stake is a discrete location over a set of ordered alternatives. Of course, the
income magnitude aects the equilibrium price but through its eect on utility levels.276 ANA PAULA MARTINS





)   vj(Ij;0) < pMF;j = n + 1;n + 2;::: (108)
where I1

is the lowest income of the paired individuals. While the reverse
is occurring | as in any market |, there is excess demand for matching and
pMF will be increasing while additional matches are being arranged, process




i < pMF  dk

i - for all the (some...) n mated partners.
Or the closest mated income to the (an) excluded j, say j +1, is mated










) < pMF;j = n + 1;n + 2;::: (109)
(108) would apply when lower incomes are not mated | arising with posi-
tive assortative mating; (109) when middle incomes are not mated, expect-
ed with negative assortative mating.
For the resulting arrangement to be optimal for individual i |for him to
achieve the maximum and not the minimum utility with marginal benet
to price equalization -, one requires the marginal benet to be decreasing












 2)] < 0 | where k 2 is the next best match to (before income)
k   1. This is satised if @
2i
@Ik2 < 025 and existing income levels in the
economy are equally spaced.
Now, for dk

i to be constant in the economy, Ii and the income of the
pair, Ik





































25As in conventional continuous optimization, non-convexities | e.g., increasing re-
turns to scale | may generate equilibrium failure, as well as validity of interior FOC of
the ecient allocation solution.CALLS AND COUPLES 277
Assume that income levels are equally or uniformly spaced in the econ-































































@Ik2 . Then we expect

















@Ik2 < 0 (required by SOC for maximum benet), then dI
k
dIi > 0
and we register positive assortative mating | as income rises, so does that






@Ii@Ik > 0. dI
k
dIi < 0 and we register negative








Similar conclusions would be obtained if we reasoned with the marginal






) = constant;i = 1;2;:::;n. Provided @
2i












@Ik2 > 0, marginal benet equalization leads to minimum indi-
vidual (and, thus, aggregate) utility; such minimization would be consistent
with assignments such that dI
k
dIi < 0, i.e., negative (positive) assortative
mating, i @
2i
@Ii@Ik > (<)0. But, when SOC fail, the marginal equalization
principle | and the law of one price | fails: demands for match rank-







@Ii@Ik > 0, a match with simultaneously high income of partner-
s generates a higher utility surplus, transferable within the couple, and






@Ii@Ik < 0, a match
with dissimilar income levels would; i.e., we always (still) expect - because
utility is transferable - the equilibrium assignment to be the optimal ag-
gregate one. But the failure of the market match price equalization would
confer bargaining power within some range to individuals within each pair
| and lead to multiple possible arrangements of eective transfers occur-
ring within the couple, eventually colliding with the optimality conditions
generating the indirect utility functions...
Admit that mating can only occur between an individual of group M
(males, 1;2;:::;nA) and another of group F (females, nA+1;nA+2;:::;n).278 ANA PAULA MARTINS
One could think that dierent prices could be formed for rankings of each
group, say pM for ranking points of males | equalized to the marginal
benet that individuals of group F are deriving from mating with those
of group M | and pF for those of females | the marginal benet that
males are deriving from mating with females26. An individual of group
M(i = 1;2;:::;min(nM;nF), ordered ascendingly by income on group M,
where min(nM;nF) are individuals that end-up eectively mated) would
pay to an individual of group F(k = 1;2;:::;min(nM;nF), ordered as-






1;2;:::;min(nM;nF);k = 1;2;:::;min(nM;nF); consistently, an individ-
ual of group F(k = 1;2;:::;min(nM;nF)) would pay to an individual of






1;2;:::;min(nM;nF);i = 1;2;:::;min(nM;nF); the individual of each
group would equalize his marginal benet to the price of the ranking points
of the other group. Yet, equilibrium would not yet be dened, once it re-
quires additionally an overall appraisal of the two groups relative income
availability. Moreover, interpersonal comparison with the own group rank-
ings end up by being made indirectly, which is not accounted for by that
pricing system.
One would therefore speculate that the previous | uniform pricing |
rule still applies, with marginal benet and ranking order of individuals
| unique and uniquely priced | being calculated as if one could also
mate with people of the own group; the equilibrium price of ranking points










approximate: the marginal benet of a mate in the economy | the price
of ranking points for matching purposes | would attempt to equalize.
Under unbalanced groups, the last rule may, again not be sucient. If
there is:














;0) < pM if nA < n   nA and only nAF's are mated
| with 1 the lowest income mated of the other group | for individuals
j (of M), j0 (of F) not mated (that preferred not to match in the optimal
assignment) of each group. Given the positive sorting, low income levels
are expected to be excluded, and the highest excluded income qualies the
relevant marginal unmated individual, j or j0. And due to the evolution of
marginal benet, the price approximation rule may be sucient.
26As equalization of marginal benet for each group equalizes, cross-derivative corre-
spondence with the sign of sorting is still be valid.CALLS AND COUPLES 279









) < pM if nA > n nA and only n nAM's










) < pF if nA < n nA and only
nAF's are mated | with i the individual mated with next lowest income
relative to the excluded (not mated) individuals j (of M), j0 (of F) of each
group. Given the negative assorting, middle income levels are expected to
be excluded, and the lowest excluded income qualies the relevant marginal
unmated individual, j or j0, j or j0.
With positive assortative mating, the eective transfer between the pairs
in a couple tends to 0. Yet, the ranking points price system must be at
least latent | insuring (provided SOC hold) equalization of the marginal
benet across the economy and not other (non-optimal in the presence
of utility transferability) mating rule. With negative assortative mating,
non-negligible transfers eectively occur between pairs.
6.3. Transferable Income
If utility is not transferable across individuals but income is, one could
advance that the marginal benet equated across individuals would be


















vi[Ii   (k   i)pMF;Ik

+ (k   i)pMF]
= vi[Ii   (k   1   i)pMF;Ik
 1 + (k   1   i)pMF] (114)
Individual i chooses k maximizing vi[Ii   (k   i)pMF;Ik + (k   i)pMF],
which would generate FOC implying that the dierence between the left
and right hand-sides of (112) | the marginal net-of-cost benet | ap-
proaches zero.
pMF is now a price measured in income units and D0k

i deducted to the
individual i's own resources. It reects the fact that a couple's budget
constraints or resources can be pooled, and it incorporates a measure of
the strength of the individual in the household allocation decision.
27These are also the expected market features if both utility and income are trans-
ferable, provided that vi(Ii;Ik) is quasi-concave in the two arguments: i chooses k by
making the derivative of vi(Ii;Ik) with respect to k | the dierence between the left
and right-hand side terms of each of the expressions | equal to zero.280 ANA PAULA MARTINS






































































@Ik ) - is concave in Ik; dI
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6.4. Absence of Transferability
If neither utility nor income are transferable, we may speculate that
willingness to form a pair will still be ruled by the previous mechanism
| a matching market. Yet, the equilibrium is going to press the actual
transfer between individuals of each couple to zero | not to equalization







 1)](k   i) = 0;i = 1;2;:::;n (117)
Positive assortative mating is then always expected | the absolute value
of (k   i) being minimized:
k  i;i = 1;2;:::;n29 (118)
28v0
i(Ii;Ik) can be seen as inversely related to \boldness" | see Aumann and Kurz
(1977) -, the semi-elasticity of the utility with respect to the argument; here, the de-
nominator is deducted from the compensating eect through the partner's income.
29If vi(i;k) is i's utility when paired with k and ij is the preference ordering assessment
of individual i by individual j | in a scale of 1 (least preferred) to n 1 (most preferred)
|, one can adventure a simple algorithm that under non-transferable utilities would








kj;i;k = 1;2;:::;n - that is, minimizing
the average absolute distance between the rankings in each duo (provided all i's are
considered acceptable to k and vice-versa | i.e., with unacceptability to j of partner i,CALLS AND COUPLES 281
as forwarded in the beginning of the section.
Here, n would include all individuals. If there are two groups, then
rankings (here exogenous and xed...) go from 1 to n for the largest
group, from the dierence in elements between the two groups plus 1 to n
for the smallest.
Without transferability of any sort, such equilibrium is ecient as well.
6.5. The Ecient Allocation
Some nal appraisal on mating eciency can be forwarded. Firstly, none
of the conditions qualies social eciency: this requires a social welfare
function and also some redistribution possibilities over utility, its arguments
or through match dictation...With transferable utility, a Benthamite |
maximizing sum of individuals' utilities30 | optimization criterion does
not guarantee a social optimum for all possible welfare functions either:
the transfer dictated by the latter, not by the Benthamite one, would also
have to eectively take place afterwards...
Also, never do we expect to approach a pure Benthamite result: the
transfers occur only between members of a couple. On the one hand, the
maximization rule of the sum of utilities invoked before applies only to the
transferable utility case, and on the other, refers to the sum of \indirect"
utilities...
An ecient allocation with monogamous matching and transferable util-
ities | through mating but not other | can be linked to a problem of type




















;j 6= i;k;lj;l = 1;2;:::;n (and j with l on-




























j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n: transfers are adjustable
to provide optimal partnership well-being.






With transferable endowments to a mate | but not other nor utili-
ty |, given that the shared good must be consumed at the same lev-
the algorithm should be so constrained, and possibly allow ij to be 0 for such cases, and
j choose ij in the scale of 1 to the number of acceptable choices to him/her out of the
total individuals minus 1 | of the maximum individuals in each group, n, if one cannot
match with the same group, for which ij would start at the dierence plus 1.) See Gale
and Shapley (1962) and Roth (1984) on optimal assignment.
30Which, in any case, it is not our general implicit criterion | only for matching
purposes...282 ANA PAULA MARTINS
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j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n: income transferability be-
tween partners allows any allocations xi + xj = x
i + x
j where the lat-
ter are the solution found for two partners i and j | then, transfer-
s are adjustable to provide optimal partnership well-being. (Of course,
for appropriate U
j





i ), generates the same solution as that of the
current paragraph.)
Transferability of both endowments and utility between individuals in a














l )  U0jl
;j 6= i;k;lj;l = 1;2;:::;n
(and j with l only): no denition of individual utility levels would be sup-
plied...
As noted in section 3, the Samuelson condition is expected to hold in
any of the ecient allocations.
6.6. Cobb-Douglas Preferences: An Example





@Ii@Ik = 0 | there will be no assortative \matching" | nor positive,
nor negative; but the qualication relies here on the interpretation of the
cross eect only on the level of zk
i (per couple). To conclude about couple









(Ii+Ik)2 . As @
2i




(Ii+Ik)2Ii > 0 i Ik >
1 i
iai Ii,
positive assortative \mating" is expected if the direct utility function ex-
hibits constant or increasing returns to scale | and utility is transferable
across individuals.
An individual of any type will prefer to mate an individual with higher
income | a higher vk
i . If i  1 (IRS or CRS), there will be correspon-
dence; then linkages will sort themselves by decreasing income levels. With
DRS, if in the economy, for any i;k;Ii >
iai
1 iIk, negative assorting can
occur | with strongly decreasing returns to scale and a low relative prefer-
ence for the individual private good; if the reverse happens, we still observe
positive assorting in couple formation.
In sum, with non-decreasing returns to scale, \doubly-good" marriages
will be popular | but these not necessarily longer or with more children
(not involving higher zk







31See Becker (1973), p. 826 and 841, and Lam (1988).CALLS AND COUPLES 283
If utility is not transferable but income is, the mating qualication would





























@Ii@Ik = 0: with non-transferable utility
and transferable income, no assortative mating is expected.
6.7. Final Discussion
Congestion of linkages | say, a xed number of linkages | would also
generate a ranking market. Say r links are supported by each individu-
al and indirect utilities are of the form vi(Ii;Ik1;Ik2;:::;Ikr) and utility
is transferable; it is possible that, with Iki ordered ascendingly, that the
equilibrium will imply that for all individuals (and one relevant group)
vi(Ii;Ik1;Ik2;:::;Ikr)   vi(Ii;Ik1 1;Ik2;:::;Ikr 1;Ikr) = p = con-
stant | i solves maxk1;k2;:::;kr 1;kr vi(Ii;Ik1;Ik
2
;:::;Ikr)+pri pk1 pk2 
 pkr |, where Ik1 1 is the income of the highest income lower to Ik1.
Illustrating special arrangements, some of social others of engineering
interest:
Case A. Group Formation. 1  ! 2 3
z3
1 = y3




2 = 0 and z2
3 = y2
3 = 0
Links between 1 (2) and 3 are too expensive. Such case may arise either
due to 3's utility function valuing less communication (z's and y's) than
the others; or by either 1 and 2's (or all...) utility functions embedding





















i ), but not with the











Case B. Transit Sequence. 1  ! 2  ! 3
z3
1 = y3
1 = 0 and z1
3 = y1
3 = 0.
If utility is related to distance | and 1 and 3 are more distant than 2 is
to either 1 or 3 | a transit sequence appears.
Case C. One-Way Transit Sequence. 1  ! 2  ! 3
z3
1 = y3







This case may also suggest a multiple layer hierarchy.










2 = 0 and z2
3 = y2
3 = 0
Attention of 1 seems more important than that of all other individuals.
Notice that it may mean that equilibrium specic-transfers obtained from
1 are relatively higher in equilibrium.284 ANA PAULA MARTINS





2 = y261 = 0; z1
3 = y1
3 = 0; z3
2 = y3
2 = 0 and z2
3 = y2
3 = 0
1 may be an advertising point. Or, in a hierarchic chain, it has a leading
role with respect to the purchase of (decisions over) z.






2 = 0; z3
2 = y3
2 = 0; z3
1 = y3
1 = 0
7. PUBLIC GOOD VS. SHARED GOOD
In this section, we inspect the case where the externality is extended
to more than one consumer, even if to a xed number: if the number is
not xed, we would fall under a typical club good case. There will be an
ecient allocation but the market may no longer insure its attainment...




j = yj. Then each z
j
i | as yj | is replicated among the n consumers.
Let us then admit it is unique or uniform. i's utility takes the form
Ui(xi;zi;y1;y2;:::;yi 1;yi+1;:::;yn) (120)
We will denote it by Ui(xi;zi;y i). I obtains utility from the private
good, xi, from its own purchases of the public good, zi, and from the
purchases other consumers make, yj, so that:
zj = yj;j = 1;2;:::;n (121)
Of course, each zi is then a conventional public good | we have n dier-
ent public goods in the economy. A special case where a common (unique)
public good is formed arises for Ui(xi;zi;y1;y2;:::;yi 1;yi+1;:::;yn) =
Ui(xi;zi + y1 + y2 +  + yi 1 + yi+1 +  + yn) with (119) holding.








;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (123)


















































x   x = 0(1 equation) (128)
 jUj







zk   z = 0;k = 1;2;:::;n(n equation) (130)







;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (131)
Replacing (131) in (130), and equating the two (and (128)) we obtain















;i = 1;2;:::;n(n equations) (132)
Let us consider a price-cum-transfer system analogous to that of the call
to decentralize that ecient solution. Each consumer i pays pz for zi and
py per unit of yj, i.e., by zj;j 6= i; he pays t
j
i;j 6= i, to each of the other
n   1 individuals for accepting his choice of zi and receives ti
j from each
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and FOC for i = 1;2;:::;n:
Ui














A = 0 (136)
Ui
zj   (py   ti
j) = 0;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n (137)























;j 6= i;j = 1;2;:::;n(n   1 eqs. for each i) (139)
Equilibrium requires additionally:
p0















A full price system can be derived: (138) and (139) and individual budget
constraints generate n(n+1) equations that add to (140)-(142): n(n+
1) + 3 equations with (the sum of budget constraints making) one of the

























px ) | with n(n 1)+3





px, a determined solution is obtained for all relative prices (in
terms of good x).
But if under one-to-one communication, replication of individuals of each
type may insure competitive link-specic transfer price formation | we
know who to charge what (even if we x one price) given the actual transfer
|, now, such possibility may no longer exist | and the natural spontaneity
of the equilibrium breaks down...
I.e., competitive decentralization requires | apart from absence of trans-
action costs | a smaller number of individuals types than the total number
of individuals in the economy | and responsibility for each part of, or the
common purchase to be assigned to someone | some type | in particular.
With some agent heterogeneity, the nal cost shares will be in line with
marginal utilities. But | as is well-known | perfect information and type
discrimination must then be ensured.
If i cannot veto zj for j 6= i, | he does not directly obey (137) and,









j)zj from (each) i, the ecient allocation is also ensured ((139) becomes
redundant) | but then not entirely through the market price system.
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
General equilibrium of a pure exchange economy was proven to be able
to generate ecient allocations in economies where share goods are present;
under special arrangements, uniqueness is also guaranteed. Ecient allo-
cations require the Samuelson (public good) rule with respect to the ratio
of utilities | whether or not sharing takes the form of an externality. Op-
timal pricing involves common reception and emission prices | adding
up to a uniquely determined quantity | along with link-specic transfers
from consumers who value a specic \call" more than its charged price.
End-specic roles | for adequate general price allocation | must also
be pre-ordained | achieved with a (much) milder version of (than) the
Arrow's dictator.
With multiple sharing by more than two individuals | because either
the good is shared by more than one individual or because there are sim-
ilar links between dierent pairs |, some indeterminacy may arise with
respect to the distribution of the general aggregate unit cost. Of course,
heterogeneity requires more complex identication.
CES utility functions generate interesting environments. With transfer-
able utility, positive assortative mating is likely to arise with linear ho-
mogeneity or higher | and negative with strong DRS and/or low relative
preferences for joint-consumption. Cobb-Douglas technologies, generating288 ANA PAULA MARTINS
linear Engel curves, suggest no quantity assorting of household good de-
mand.
Utility functions implying monogamy allowed us to study mating ar-
rangements more profoundly. Denition of the marginal benet of a match
| and price of ranking points | was forwarded, and mechanics of an ade-
quate (dowry) price system for an endogenous matching market explained;
with transferable utility, the requirement of equalization of marginal benet
of a match across individuals provides the direction of assortative mating.
If utility is not transferable but income | qualifying assorting | is, then
it is the income value of the marginal benet that is expected to equalize in
the economy; this suggests the importance of the function given by the ra-
tio of utility over the dierence between the marginal utility relative to own
income minus the marginal with respect to the partner's in determining the
outcome of decentralized assorting.
Fruitful extensions are expected in family economic modelling and esti-
mation, both in the static as in the intertemporal domain, with household
decisions also covering labor market participation and supply, allowing for
joint family investment | and taxation |, encompassing both single and
multi-element unit as special cases, possibly assuming single and married,
male and female (with or without children |, parameter preference dier-
entiation.
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